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Abstract In November 2010, the G20 Summit was held in Seoul. The G20 has
increasingly replaced the G8 as being the premier forum for international economic
cooperation, but in November 2010, it was the first time that a summit was held in
country that was not a G8 member. It was by the Korean government seen as
evidence of the country finally having achieved the goal of becoming an advanced
nation playing, while still constrained by the division of the peninsula, a global role in
line with its economic standing. The article argues that this has been a constant theme
in Korea’s foreign policy since it was originally formulated in 1994 as part of the
country’s globalization policy. This addition of an intentional dimension, to the
objective capabilities created during the previous decades, has increasingly resulted
in the type of behavior associated with middle power status.
Introduction
In early January 2011, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance in South Korea (hence-
forth Korea) announced that GDP in 2010 had surpassed the psychological important
milestone of US$1 trillion. This meant that the country now was either the 13th or
14th largest economy in the world (Korea Joongang Daily, January 5, 2010, p. 4).
Taken together with a 2011 population of 49 million (Statistics Korea 2011), and
military spending of US$ 28 Billion (SIPRI 2012) Korea should, based only on
capabilities, be considered a member of the group of countries labeled ‘middle
powers’ (Choi 2009; Cooper 2010; Kim and Jones 2007; Neack 2008; Robertson
2007; Rozman 2006).
In addition to the phenomenal rise of the country in the economic rankings, the
country’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping operations (by 2010 it was the
32nd largest contributor) and Official Development Aid (US$ 1.8 billion in 2012,
making it the 17th largest among the 23 major donor nations in the world), the
successful hosting of the first G20 Summit in East Asia in 2010, the Fourth High-
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level Forum for Development Effectiveness in 2011, and the 2nd World Nuclear
Security Summit in March 2012, as well as the central role in regards to the
promotion of the Green Growth initiative played by the country at the Rio+20
conference in June 2012, could be seen as evidence of Korea, in addition to
possessing the aforementioned capabilities, increasingly displaying the behavior that
it is associated with middle power status.
Traditionally, Korea’s foreign policy was dominated by three themes: legitimacy,
security, and development (Kihl 2005). The country was seen as being “endowed
with only limited potential for the management of international affairs” (Koo 1985,
15). However, for close to two decades Korean governments have, in addition to
those three traditional themes, emphasized the aspirations of taking advantage of
globalization to improve the status and international position of the country. Korea’s
rise to middle power status could, hence, be seen as the result of a deliberate policy
choice made by political leaders, and the hosting of the G20 Summit in 2010 is
viewed by the government as a critical recognition of the country’s arrival as a
significant international actor. This recognition could be a, maybe temporary, con-
clusion on a long journey begun with the introduction of the globalization policy in
1994, when in addition to the necessary objective capabilities established over the
previous decades, we saw the development of the aspirations that increasingly have
led to the behavior associated with middle power status.
This article begins by looking into the debate on the concept of ‘middle power’. It
argues that this status must be seen as a combination of two dimensions: an attribute,
or capacity, dimension that include elements as such as size of population, military,
and economy; and an intentional dimension, a result of political leadership, that
emphasizes the intention of the a country to seek to play a larger role in international
society which leads it to engage in certain types of behavior. The article then
elaborates on how aspirations of creating an advanced nation and expand the inter-
national role of the country was a central element in the Kim Young-sam govern-
ment’s globalization, or segyehwa, policy, and it argues that these aspirations, that
increasingly have driven foreign policy actions in the direction of the behavior
usually associated with middle powers, have remained as constant themes of succes-
sive administrations up to the present. Next, the article analyzes the shift from G8 to
G20 arguing that this international development created new opportunities for Korea.
It then turns to an analysis of the Seoul G20 Summit in following section. Finally, in
the conclusion it assert that while Korea remains constrained in its pursuit of middle
power activism by the continuing tension on the peninsula, and the actual results of
the G20 Seoul Summit were unsatisfactory to many, it was nevertheless by Korean
policy makers seen as a successful step on the journey begun back in 1994, when the
aspirations of ‘taking our proper place in the world’ first were advanced.
What is a middle power? making sense of a label
There is no single definition of ‘middle power’ that is widely accepted by the scholarly
community (Gecelovsky 2009, 79). In the structural, or positional, approach middle
powers are said to be those states occupying the ‘middle’ point in a range of bigness to
smallness, usually measured by reference to objective attributes: area, population, size,
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strength of economy, and military capabilities. Holbrand (1971), for instance, while
recognizing the difficulty in measuring the strength and defining the power of a country,
argues that middle powers are distinguished from great powers solely by their lack of
these capabilities. In that vein Wood, seeking an easily accessible way of differentiating
middle powers from other states, uses GDP as his main indicator. Using, as he admits, a
“rather more arbitrary process” in determining the boundaries of the group, he argues for
including the countries that fall between the sixth and 36th in GDP ranking (1987, 6).
This generates a list of 36 countries all with a GDP between US$40 Billion and US400
Billion.1 However, while his analysis generates an easy way of listing middle powers by
attributes, it is important to bear in mind that this does not explain why some of these
countries engage in middle power behavior and others do not (Gecelovsky 2009).
Another bid at defining the concept is attempted by Neack who using cluster analysis
argues “that the international state system is structured by three distinct state
groups—labeled great, middle, and small states” (Neack 1993, 347). Using five vari-
ables: size of population, military expenditures per capita, GNP per capita, infant
mortality rate, and literacy rate she divides the post-World War II period into three
(1945–1962, 1963–1969, and 1970–1979) and performs a cluster analysis for those
periods. She finds remarkable stability in cluster membership over time. In fact, more
than 80% of the analyzed countries remain in the same group over the three periods with
Korea, for instance, in her analysis a middle power throughout all three periods.
However, while her analysis gives us a capacity-based picture of the relative positioning
of states over time, in her later work Neack moves towards a more functional approach,
as she emphasizes a country’s membership in international organizations, and the ability
of the country, under specific circumstances, to influence the workings of such organi-
zations, arguing that the countries that consider themselves as middle powers associate
this with playing a particular function (Neack 2008, 162–164).
To a certain extent the concept ‘middle power’ comes fromCanadian policymakers and
scholars who at the end of World War II sought to clarify the country’s position and
function in the emergingworld order (Higgott and Cooper 1990). It was here the functional
capabilities of some states that were seen as setting them apart from less influential states,
and it were those functional attributes that led them be labeled as middle powers.2
However, there has been a shift away from functional attributes as the focal point
to include agential characteristics that focus on a behavioral dimension (Cooper
1997). Cooper et al. (1993) argue that it is the psychological, or behavioral, dimen-
sion that needs to be fulfilled for a state to classify as a middle power. In their model
middle powers are defined by their capacity, and intention, to take the initiative,
particular in multilateral forums, when it comes to dealing with areas, or “niches” in
which the middle power sees itself, and is seen by other states, as having the
necessary qualifications (Cooper 1997). This move beyond the exclusive focus on
structural position and physical attributes, to include a psychological, or intentional
dimension which can only be due to political leadership, is supplemented by Connors
who, in his analysis of Australia, argues that the idea of middle powers has been
1 Using 1979 statistics Wood’s list of middle powers does include Korea which in 1979 had a GDP of
US$65 Billion.
2 Focusing on the ability to influence international politics, Gelber (1946), in his analysis of Canada’s post-
World War II international position, argues for having been a non-permanent member of the Security
Council as indicative of middle power status.
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deployed to delineate a particular form of state behavior by middle-sized states. This
behavior is characterized by an emphasis on seeking multilateral solutions to inter-
national problems often leading middle powers to “build international order through
co-operative institution building” (2004, 92). As argued by a former Australian
foreign minister, when it comes to defining which countries are middle powers
“objective criteria like GDP, population size, physical size, and military capability
can be no more than starting points” (Evans 2011). However, as Cox (1989) reminds
us, while it is a state’s aspirations, and the pursuit of these aspirations facilitated
through political leadership, that makes it a middle power, neither the structural
context within which a middle power is situated, nor the material capabilities of that
state, should be neglected as these to a certain degree constrain, or facilitate, the
ability of a state to pursue its aspirations.
This might in particular be the case with the ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ powers, some of
which are seen as “pivotal” states of geostrategic importance (Chase et al. 1999; see also
Özkan 2006). New middle powers, argued by Jordaan to be those middle powers that
assumed their “internationalist postures after the Cold War” (2003, 171), are not
necessarily situated in the same structural context as traditional middle powers
(Hurrell 2006). In fact, with the shift in global focus from security to economic issues
these ‘new’middle powers find themselves in global structural context that is profound-
ly different from the one that ‘traditional’ middle powers found themselves in. It is the
end of the Cold War, globalization, and the erosion of US hegemony that has facilitated
the emerging of these ‘new’ middle powers through a power transition and power
diffusion (Nye 2011). Because of this the importance of structure has diminished in
explaining international relations, and the role of agents in the international system has
assumed greater importance with, as Ravenhill (1998) argues, ambitions and political
leadership being the critical element in explaining why among those countries with
objective middle power capabilities some, but not others, engage in what is considered
middle power behavior.
It was in 1994 as part of the segyehwa, or globalization, policy of the Kim
Young-sam government that ambitions of playing a larger global role more in line
with the country’s economic importance first were explicitly stated. The Kim
Young-sam government here added a crucial intentional dimension to the objective
capabilities that had been created since the country’s economic take-off in the mid-
1960s.
Becoming an advanced nation: the segyehwa policy
It was in November 1994, after his participation in the APEC Summit, that President
Kim Young-sam formally announced his globalization policy. This was following upon
a declaration a year earlier by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Han Sung-joo, outlining
the five basic elements of the government’s new diplomacy: globalization, diversifica-
tion, multi-dimensionalism [sic], regional cooperation, and futuristic [sic] orientation
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994, 15–18). Korea had joined the United Nations in 1991
and the purpose of the new policy was to build on this in order to diversify the number
and scope of diplomatic and trade relations with the goal of breaking away from
the dominance of the Korea–US bilateral relationship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
400 C.J. Saxer
1993).3 It was emphasized that the country should expand its diplomatic activities beyond
Northeast Asia,while at the same time retain the pragmatic RohTae-woo policy of enhancing
multilateral security cooperation in the region (Moon andKim2004;Koh 2001). Korea’s first
post-transition president, RohTae-woo, building on the successful 1988 SeoulOlympics, had
sought to engage in multilateralism as part of his Northern Policy with a proposal for the
establishment of a Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia (Koh 2001). While
this proposal was not favorably received in the region, the Roh government did succeed in
establishing diplomatic relations with both Russia and China.
Measured by objective capabilities alone, Korea was by the end of Roh Tae-woo
Administration (1988–1993) a middle power. Its GDP was the 13th largest in world,
having been the 18th largest in 1987 when the country democratized, and the country was
the 25th most populous in world. The crucial element that was been missing were the
aspirations of playing a role globally more in line with the capabilities developed during
the previous decades. Seeking to become, in the words of the Committee for Globalization
Policy (1998, 22–23), the KimYoung-sam government (1993–1998) set out to remedy this
as it sought to move beyond the Roh Administration’s preoccupation with Northeast Asia,
and increasingly engage in what are seen as middle power activities. In 1993, Korea
participated for the first time in UN peacekeeping operations as it deployed a road
repairing battalion to Somalia. This would be followed by the deployment of an army
medical team to West Sahara in 1994, and the 1995 dispatch of army engineers to Angola
in addition to smaller numbers of observers dispatched to other UN-led missions (Koh
2000, 209; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2009, 190). A similar increase was not
yet seen in official development assistance (ODA), another activity usually associated
with middle power behavior, with Korea in 1993 allocating merely 0.03 % of its GNI for
ODA. This had by 1998 only increased to 0.04 %.
Two of the main foreign policy goals of the Kim Administration were, however,
achieved as the country first in November 1995 was elected a non-permanent member
of the UN Security Council, and then at the end of 1996 successfully joined the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Office of the
President 1997, 132). By the administration OECD membership was seen as a
significant first step towards the goal of establishing a new role for the country on
the international arena. While coming under increasing criticism for corruption within
his administration the president continued throughout his tenure to push his global-
ization strategy. However, as he increasingly lost his moral authority many of the
planned reforms that were part of his globalization policy would have to await his
successor, Kim Dae-jung, who as he entered the Blue House, would find himself
faced with the financial crisis of 1997–1998.
The Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun administrations
Although he abolished Kim Young-sam’s Globalization Committee, the new govern-
ment under Kim Dae-jung did not abandon the segyehwa policy, as it embraced further
globalization as the only way for Korea to escape the financial crisis (Koh 2000, 212).
3 In 1993 Korea’s trade dependency was 53 % with the US share of that trade above 16 %, so it made sense
for the Korean government to strive for trade diversification. By 2011, trade dependency was above 113 %,
but the US share of total Korean trade was down to 9 % (Korea Statistical Information Service 2012).
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As Kim Young-sam had before him, Kim Dae-jung also saw globalization as an
opportunity for Korea to become a “first-class nation in the twenty-first century” and
he acknowledged that the desired increase in status and influence came with interna-
tional expectations of a certain type of behavior when he stated the country was willing
to “make a fitting contribution” to the international community (Kim 2004, 114). This
“fitting contribution” included an increase in the country’s financial contributions to
both the voluntary and the regular UN budget which went from 0.69 % in 1994 to
0.95 % in 1998, and maintaining the high level of participation in PKO activities
established by the previous government with the additional deployment of troops to
East Timor in 1999.
During the Kim Dae-jung Administration the focus of most foreign policy initiatives
did, however, remain on East Asia where it emphasized its commitment to shape and
coordinate multilateral activities. Following upon the establishment of the ASEAN + 3
in 1997, Korea, hence, played an increasingly important role in generating the momen-
tum for further integration in the region by hosting the Third ASEM in October 2000,
and by taking a leading role in the establishment of such advisory committees as the East
Asian Study Group (EASG) in 2000 and the East Asia Forum in 2003 (Choi 2009;
Rozman 2006). As part of its Sunshine Policy the administration also sought to
encourage “third-country engagement with North Korea” which is by Robertson, while
recognizing the constrains of the security requirements, seen as indicative of the country
increasingly engaging in middle power behavior (2007, 159).
The Kim Dae-jung government also sought to strengthen its bilateral trade nego-
tiations. Intensifying regionalization of the global trading regime created a sense of
urgency among Korean policy makers as they feared that developments in the
international trading regime would leave the country out in the cold. The suggestion
the country should pursue negotiations on free trade agreements (FTA) was first
raised in 1998 as the country was pulling itself out of the East Asian financial crisis.
The Inter-Ministerial Trade Policy Coordination Committee that had been established
by President Kim Dae-jung to seek responses to the financial crisis suggested in
November of 1998 that the country should work towards the conclusion of a FTA
with either Chile or South Africa. Chile was thought to have an industrial structure
that complemented Korea’s the most, and it was, hence, by December 1999 decided
to approach the country with the suggestion that negotiations commence. It was
hoped that by first negotiating a FTAwith a relatively smaller economy, Korea would
gain valuable experience while minimizing the adjustment costs for the economy.
During four rounds of negotiations from December 1999 to December 2000 more
than 80 % of the text of the agreement was settled. However, negotiations stalled in
late 2000 as talks on agricultural products broke down. While Chile saw potential
benefits in an opening of the Korean agricultural market and, hence, demanded that
no exceptions be made in agricultural products, the Korean government was under
pressure at home not to open its agricultural market. The importance of farmers as a
political force, together with an increasing number of NGOs supporting the farmers,
combined with the upcoming National and Presidential elections scheduled for
December 2000 and 2002, respectively, made it imperative for domestic political
reasons that the government and the ruling party was seen as taking the concerns of
this important societal group into consideration. The government, under such public
pressure and realizing that the governing party itself was about to abandon it, pushed
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the Chileans, with success, for exemptions on apples, pears, and rice. Still, reaching
an agreement with Chile took significant longer than the government had expected,
and it was first in October 2002 that the negotiations were concluded. When then the
agreement came up before the National Assembly for ratification it took close to a
year of further negotiations with vested interest groups, and significant new subsidies
to those industrial sectors affected by the agreement, before ratification was achieved
(Enia 2009, 359).4
Kim Dae-jung’s policies, both in regard to North Korea (his Sunshine policy
became Roh Mu-hyon’s Peace and Prosperity policy), and in regards to globalization
(which now included the promotion of FTAs), as well as seeking to play a larger
regional role, continued under his successor. In his inauguration speech in February
2003, RohMu-hyun, as Kim Young-sam and KimDae-jung before him, argued for the
need to play a more active role internationally. However, more so than his predeces-
sors Roh’s focus was regional as he argued that the “Age of Northeast Asia was fast
approaching” and that the country, hence, should, and could, “play a pivotal role in the
age of Northeast Asia in the 21st Century” (Roh 2003). This “pivotal role” included a
proposal to develop the country into an Economic Hub for Northeast Asia, and the idea
of Korea taking a balancer role in the region in order to ease tensions. This generated
significant controversy, as the idea of the country, while dependent on the USA–Korea
bilateral defense agreement, could serve in that capacity in the region was not only
seen by many as unrealistic, but also potentially damaging to the relationship with the
USA (Kim 2007, 215; Choi, 2009, 54).5 By measures of capabilities, and aspirations,
the country was by then without doubt a middle power, and the Roh government, as
the previous administrations, now sought a way that would make it possible for the
country to also play the role of a middle power. However, it had to recognize that
because of the tensions on the peninsula its space for maneuver in Northeast Asia was
still limited, and it instead turned its eyes beyond the region for opportunities to
enhance its status and position.
A Presidential Commission on Policy Planning began work on the strategies and
policies needed, however, it was first at the very end of the Roh Administration that a
comprehensive strategy and policy review report was completed. While criticizing the
flawed policy implementation of previous administrations the report confirmed the main
goal of taking advantage of the opportunities arising from globalization to create an
advanced nation. This was in the report linked to the “active pursuit of overseas
openness” with the ultimate goal of “entering the ranks of advanced countries” now
estimated to be achieved before 2020 with the country by 2030, according to the very
ambitious goals stated in the report, becoming a “leading world nation” (Presidential
Commission on Policy Planning 2008, 128). The report explicitly labeled the country a
“strong middle power” and suggested that by 2020 Korea would be among the eight
largest economies in the world (318–323). However, it was also recognized in the report
4 South Korea has of March 2013 concluded FTAs with 45 countries including the United States, the
European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is currently engaged in bilateral
negotiations with a number of other countries, among them Canada, as well as having begun trilateral
negotiations with Japan and China. In addition, with Japan having recently announced that it will join the
US-led Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), the USA is strongly encouraging Korea to also
join the TPP.
5 For one of the few positive evaluations of the “balancer” concept see Moon (2012, 214)
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that the country would have to move beyond the regional focus of the KimDae-jung and
Roh Mu-hyun Administrations, and return to the originals ideas of diplomatic diversi-
fication that were part of the segyehwa policy as formulated during the Kim Young-sam
Administration. This would entail a strengthening of the diplomatic capacity of the
country that the report suggested was urgently needed (320). The report further recog-
nized that in light of the country’s current status, and future ambitions, it would have to
be willing to raise its international contributions, and it here emphasized the need to
increase official development assistance and to further the country’s participation in UN-
led peacekeeping operations which were, due to the more regional emphasis of the Roh
government, seen as having deteriorated to a “declaratory level.” (355).6
Roh Mu-hyun, as Kim Dae-jung, went to Pyongyang and did make progress in
placing the relationship to the North on better footing. His administration also furthered
the consolidation of democracy in Korea. However, the mostly regional focus, that
included the “balancer role” idea, meant that by the end of the Roh Administration the
country’s global role had deteriorated and the relationship with the country’s most
important bilateral partner had been damaged. The presidential election of 2007 saw,
however, the election of president who was deeply critical of the Roh’s Administration’s
policies towards North Korea, intent on repairing the frayed relationship with the USA,
and keen on yet again enhancing the country’s global role and standing.
The CEO president: Lee Myung-bak
During his presidential campaign LeeMyung-bak promoted a number of very ambitious
goals.7 Among these ambitions of boosting the country’s participation in those organi-
zations and institutions that set global agendas. In his inauguration speech the newly
elected president promoted the idea of Korea as one of the ten largest economies in the
world, and the intention of creating an “advanced nation” (Office of the President 2009a,
36). According to the president, the country would in the future seek to play a global role
that was more in line with its economic ranking, and hence, widen its diplomatic horizon
beyond the Northeast Asian region (Choi 2009).
Among the policies introduced to achieve this was his “New Asia Initiative”,
launched as the president was visiting Indonesia in March 2009, with the explicit
purpose of expanding the country’s international relations with ASEAN and beyond.
(The Korea Times, March 6, 2009, p. 2; Yi 2010). This initiative followed upon the
introduction of the “Global Korea” policy in 2008 with the president in a speech during
his visit to the USA in April 2008 unequivocally expressing the country’s ambitions of
“becoming a leading international player” (Office of the President 2009a, 120).8 Both
initiatives are part of the government’s policy of redefining the country as a middle
6 Korea increased its ODA from 0.03 % of GNI in 1994, when the segyehwa policy was initiated, to 0.15 %
in 2012, and has indicated its intention to raise it to 0.25 % of GNI by 2015 (Yu 2010, 8).
7 One of the more populist, or hyped up, slogans of the Lee Myung-bak campaign was the so-called 7-4-7
plan. The plan entailed the following goals: (1) to bring about 7 % economic growth per year; (2) raise the
country’s per capita income from below U.S.$ 20,000 to 40,000; and (3) to make Korea the seventh largest
economy in the world. It should be noted that none of the goals were achieved during the Lee
Administration.
8 It was in connection with the introduction of the ambitious Global Korea slogan that the Lee Myung-bak
government began to explicitly refer to Korea as a middle power.
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power with status, power, but also responsibilities, more in line with its global economic
ranking. The approval by the legislature in early 2010 of an “Act on Participation in UN
PKO”, allowing the government and the UN to establish provisional agreements on
matters related to the deployment of up to 1,000 peace-keepers prior to the approval of
the National Assembly, could be seen as the government’s willingness to accept the
responsibilities associated with middle power status.9
As the financial crisis began in 2008 we saw a shift away from the traditional
members of the global economic steering committee to a larger, more inclusive,
forum that brought in a number of the dynamic economies that had come to the fore
during the previous decades. It was, in the words of President Lee, during a speech at
the Munk Center at the University of Toronto in June 2009, “a rather belated
recognition of the shift in the balance of global economic power already taking place
during the last couple of decades” (Office of the President 2009b, 272). Not been a
member of the G8 the establishment of the G20 Summit meetings was from a Korean
point of view a new opportunity, and the country was eager to take advantage of this
development to increase its influence and status.
Opportunity arises: from G8 to G20
In connection with the financial crisis in the late 1990s on US initiative a G22
meeting of the finance ministers and the central bank governors of the most important
economies at that time was arranged. It was supposed to have been an one-of-kind
meeting, but a second meeting was held in the fall of 1998 with more countries
joining, bringing the total up to 33 by early 1999 (Hajnal 2007, 151). The G33 held
two meetings in 1999 to discuss reforms of the international financial architecture,
however, seeing the G33 as being too unwieldy for effective action, the G7 finance
ministers, at a meeting prior to the G8 Summit in June 1999, recommending the
establish of a G20 to deal with the “structural changes in the challenges bred by
globalization” (Kirton 2005, 4). 10 The first G20 meeting was held in Vancouver in
November 1999, and at the meeting Canada in particular, pushed for increasing the
purview of the group to include all aspects of the global economy and international
financial system. In the years after Vancouver the G20 developed into a more
effective group of 20, formally, equal members. During those years the ministerial
meetings, while flexible enough to include new issues of importance, had, as Kirton
argues, a core agenda of three subjects: “global economic growth and condition”;
“trade liberalization”; and “international codes and standards” (2005, 13). The meet-
ings also retained their focus on financial stability that had been reason for the
creation of the group in the first place. However, a push by some countries to elevate
to G20 to a leaders’ summit (L20) went at this point nowhere (Payne 2008, 529).
Nevertheless, the G20 was clearly in the ascendency over other groupings as the
global financial crisis struck in 2008, and it was, hence, a convenient group to
9 The Lee Administration did show significant willingness to participate in PKO activities with 635 troops
deployed by June 2012 (United Nations 2012).
10 The G20 was supposed to be a deliberative forum at best working in tandem with the more cohesive G8
(Hajnal 2007, 12–13).
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summon as it had been dealing with these issues for some years, and represented
more than two-thirds of world population and more than 85 % of world GDP (Kim
2010, 49). It was the US president who, upon conclusion of the G7 finance ministers’
meeting in October 2008, called for the next meeting of the G20 to be a leaders’
summit in order to deal with the economic crisis. This was an implicit recognition of
the necessity of including the emerging economies in any negotiations on how to deal
with the crisis (Cooper 2010, 748).
Meetings in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) followed
upon the Washington Summit, and it was here the decision was made to institu-
tionalize the leaders’ summit. This obviously implied that the “locus of leadership”
had shifted away from the G8 to the G20 (Cooper and Bradford 2010, 3).
Immediately after the Washington Summit, Korea had begun to push for another
summit to follow it, and in the run-up to the London Summit, it approached other
member states seeking support for hosting a summit. While there were some
countries, in particular Japan, which doubted Korea’s ability to lead (Dobson
2011, 12), the Lee government would not be deterred as it saw hosting a summit
as having the potential of boosting the country’s position as an emerging middle
power that could serve as a bridge between the developed and developing world. At
the Pittsburgh Summit, with US support, the Korean government’s lobbying paid off
as it was chosen to be the first non-G8 country to host a G20 Summit. In a radio
address upon his return from Pittsburgh, President Lee played up the potential
payoff from hosting the summit as he expressed his expectation that it would “serve
as a crucial catalyst for enhancing the country’s international standing and
upgrading its prestige” (Lee 2009).
The Seoul Summit
The successful holding of the event, hence, became a major focus for the government as
it was seen as essential in expanding the country’s global role (Yu 2010, 5). Seeking to
place a Korean stamp on the G20 negotiations the minister of finance and strategy,
together with the US secretary of the treasure, suggested to the other member states that
a 4 % cap on surpluses in the current account relative to GDP be introduced. Finding
little support for the suggestion among the finance ministers, Korea nevertheless worked
towards placing it on the agenda for the leaders’ summit in November.
In addition, at the Toronto Summit in June 2010, Korea then sought to include
economic development on the agenda by establishing a G20 Development Working
Group. Being the first non-G8 country to host a G20 Summit this could be seen as an
explicit attempt at strengthening the move away from the G8 to the G20 as the
premier forum for international economic cooperation. However, some G8 member
countries, among them Japan, Italy, and Canada, wanted the G8 to remain as the
“principal forum for advancing our common agenda of peace and security, as well as
democracy and development” (Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper quoted in
Alexandroff 2010, 43). Seeking to counter this opposition to its plans the Korean
government argued that the G20 (of which it was a member) had replaced the G8 (of
which it was not a member) as the “premier forum for international economic
cooperation”, and the Korean government subsequently pushed hard to place
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economic development as a core issue on the G20 agenda (Sakong II 2010, 3).11 Due
to its successful development experience Korea considered itself as uniquely quali-
fied to serve as a bridge between the developed and developing world, and placing
development issues firmly on the G20 agenda would enhance the country’s image
overseas by informing the world that Korea “had joined the steering group for global
economic management” (Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth
Young Soo-gil quoted in The Korea Times, August 23, 2010, p. 10). In fact, Korea
had for some time been keen on moving away from the more passive follower role it,
and other Asian countries, had pursued in the past when it came to global economic
governance (Cho 2012, 15).
However, this ‘image enhancing’ would only accrue if (1) Korea would be able to
place its fingerprint firmly on the agenda; and (2) the G20 truly would be seen as new
premier international grouping for global economic governance. Hence, it went all out
pushing not only for the inclusion of development issues on the agenda, but also in
promoting the financial safety net plan that President Lee had suggested in January
2010 at the World Economic Forum in Davos (for the president’s Davos speech see Lee
2010). The inclusion of these items on the agenda would ensure the country’s central
role in the discussions at the summit. To further to cement the G20 as the new premier
international grouping for global economic cooperation, Korea also wanted to promote a
further institutionalization of the organization by supporting the initial French sugges-
tion that the G20 become a permanent institution with a permanent secretariat that
hopefully would be located in Seoul (The Korea Times, September 20, 2010, p. 10).
Fearing for the success of the summit if the exchange rate dispute between the USA and
China came to dominate discussions, Korea officials sought to exclude the topic from
the agenda by arguing that the Seoul G20 Summit was “not the proper venue to adjust
exchange rates of certain countries” (Minister of Strategy and Finance Yoon Jeung-hyun
quoted by Yonhap News Agency, October 20, 2010).
The financial safety net proposal officially became part of the agenda at the G20
finance ministers meeting in Pusan in April, and it was included in the official
communiqué at the G20 Summit in Toronto in June. In addition, Korea also wanted to
keep the focus on the suggestion of giving certain countries, itself among them, a larger
share of the voting rights in the IMF. In Toronto the member countries agreed to conclude
discussions in Seoul on the transfer of at least 5 % of the IMF quota of European countries
to emerging countries. With Korea having a voting share of only 1.41 %, not in line with
the country’s share of the global economy, the government was keen on promoting the
idea of a reorganization of quotas as it sought to enhance its influence in the IMF.
In the weeks up to the summit Korean officials continue to play down the potential for
a currency war marring the summit, and play up even further the potential of the country
acting as a “bridge between developed and developing countries” (Chairman of
Presidential Committee for the G20 Seoul Summit Sakong Il quoted in News World
2010; see also Cherry and Dobson 2012, 114–115). However, although the government
went all out in hyping the event it was not very successful in generating excitement
11 The establishment of the G20 Summit did not see the G7/8 disappear. The G7/8 countries do still have
summits, and while initially there were some attempts at dividing the policy universe, with the increase in
the number of the issues under consideration at the G20 summits the agendas of the two increasingly
overlapped. In fact, the 2012 Los Cabos Summit has yet again shown that the division of tasks between the
G7/8 and G20 is not settled.
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among the Korean public. While hosting the summit was seen by the government as the
world’s recognition of the country’s growing prestige and its position as a leading
nation, there were voices critical of what they saw as the Lee Administration’s exag-
gerating claims on the future benefits, both economically, diplomatic, and image-wise,
to Korea from holding the summit (see, for instance, the critical editorial comment in
The Korea Times, October 13, 2010). Still, the government in the period leading up to
the event continued to emphasize the importance of the summit in “serving as a turning
point for the once major recipient of international aid to join the world’s major
economies” (President Lee quoted in The Korea Times, November 11, 2010, p.4).
During the summit the government pushed hard for a firm Korean fingerprint on the
final statement. It sought to replace the free market ideal of the so-called Washington
Consensus with a ‘Seoul Consensus’ which the Lee government hoped would become
the new economic development paradigm. Promoting the new paradigm, and increasing
its own development assistance, was, the president argued, Korea’s way of paying back
for the assistance the country had received during its half-century development from
“one of the poorest countries in the world, to become a major economy” (President Lee
quoted in The Korea Times, November 12, 2010, p. s-2).
Conflict regarding currency exchange rates, however, seemed to endanger the
successful holding of the event as there was more heated debate on the issue than
the host had anticipated. Furthermore, attempting to press the 4 % cap, the USA
came under fire as it had engaged in a second round of quantitative easing in the
weeks prior to the meeting. Korea was here walking a fine line between supporting
the USA, its traditional ally, and avoiding offending China which was its largest
trading partner and indispensable in the peace process on the peninsula. The sinking
of the Korean warship, Cheonan, in April had yet again confirmed the importance
of the bilateral defense agreement with the USA, but with China having blocked
Korea’s campaign at the UN Security Council to censure North Korea, it had also
been pressed home that the global power balance was shifting. Eager not to see
security issues block progress at the summit, President Lee walked a tightrope
between the two major powers with Korea finding itself in a position where its
interests dictated that it avoid as much as possible having to choose among the two
great powers.
The “Korea Initiative” on the establishment of a financial safety net that would
assist countries faced with a sudden “reversal of international capital flows” did make
it into the Seoul Action Plan, so did a Korea supported resolution on systemically
important institutions (The Seoul Action Plan 2010, 4). However, as a consequence of
resistance from China and a number of other nations, among them Japan and
Germany, the 4 % cap did not make into the joint statement at the end of the summit,
and Korea’s support for the originally American idea of setting a numerical cap on
current account balances, was by some analysts after the summit seen as a strategic
mistake, although its negotiators argued that it was proposed as a way of diverting
“attention from the currency debate” to the broader issue of trade imbalances, as the
currency war debate was felt to be “uncomfortable for China” (The Korea Times,
November 15, 2010, p. 10).
Concluding the negotiations on re-allocating IMF quotas was one of the easier
issues. Going into the summit there was already a consensus on the need as the both
the IMF, and the G20 member states, wanted to continue “the dynamic process aimed
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at enhancing the voice and representation of emerging market and developing
countries” (The Seoul Action Plan 2010, 4).
The summit was by the officials involved seen as Korea’s coming out event. It
represented, or so they claimed, a “clear shift in Korea’s international status”, and
showed its potential for playing a much larger international role (Yonhap News
Agency, November 12, 2010). With the financial crisis of the late 1990s still an
embarrassment to Korean policy makers, the summit was seen as proof of the country
having not only successfully overcome the crisis, but that the world was recognizing that
it had become a major player on the global scene. This ambitious view of the importance
of the summit was emphasized by the president in his 2011 New Years’ Address as he
claimed that the country “was able to stand tall in the international arena by hosting the
G20 Seoul Summit” and that the country as a consequence now had “emerged as a
nation that helps to establish the international order, rather than always having to follow
others” (Lee 2011; see also Lee 2010). The fact that Korea succeed in placing the Seoul
Development Consensus for Shared Growth as a permanent feature on the agenda of the
summits that followed the Seoul Summit (Cooper 2012, 188), at least partially supports
this ambitious interpretation of Korea’s new role. Several of the nine pillars identified in
Seoul, for instance increased infrastructure investments, were in fact later endorsed at the
2011 Cannes Summit (Blakers 2013, 9). However, while, as argued by Cherry and
Dobson (2012), 110), Korea has sought to ensure that G20 members live up to the
commitments entered into in Seoul, and the final compliance report published by the
G20 Research Group at University of Toronto does argue that the compliance of G20
members on the commitments made at Seoul is significantly higher than compliance on
commitments made at the Toronto Summit (The G20 Research Group 2011), the 2011
Cannes Summit failed in certain aspects at sustaining the momentum achieved at the
Seoul Summit. One reason for this might be the significantly enlarged agenda that
French President Sarkozy sought to promote, combined with, as argued by a Korean
vice-minister of foreign affairs and trade, the “divergent positions of developed and
developing countries on specific G20 issues such as climate change, trade, and reform of
the International Monetary Fund” (Kim 2013). With the French host not providing the
needed leadership to reconcile the different positions of the member states the outcome
was limited to some progress in the further institutionalizing of the G20 process, and, as
argued by Lee Dong-hwi, the member states “reaffirming their commitment” to the
issues discussed in Seoul (2011, 1). One reason for the lack of focus of the G20 Summits
might be the fact that every host country seeks to place its fingerprint on the meeting by
adding its own items to the agenda leading to an ever expanding agenda, with, for
instance, Mexico adding disaster risk management to the agenda at 2012 Los Cabos
Summit. In addition, environmentally sustainable growth, which had already been
promoted by the Korean hosts in 2010, was by the Mexican hosts at the 2012 Los
Cabos Summit moved to the center of the debate with the inclusion of green growth and
support for the Green Climate Fund as a cross-cutting issue on the agenda.12 The size of
the agenda seems destined only to increase, with the Russians, chairing the summit in
12 As President Lee Myung-bak came into office in 2008 he began to promote a ”Low Carbon, Green
Growth” paradigm, that included a Green Growth Initiative which led to the establishment of the Global
Green Growth Institute in Seoul (GGGI). The GGGI currently (March 2013) has 18 members and it is the
first international organization that Korea has taken the initiative in establishing. See, for instance, Choe
(2011).
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2013, already having indicated that they too will add items to the agenda. The conse-
quence of this development towards an ever expanding agenda is, as argued by some
critics, that the G20 has lost its focus (Callaghan 2013, 7).
The 2010 Seoul Summit, as well as the 2012 Los Cabos Summit, is important as it
“showcases an important functional development in the bridging role of countries that
are neither G7/8 nor BRICS members” (Cooper 2012, 189). Furthermore, Schirm
(2011) argues that the Los Cabos Summit, as the previous summits, showed that the
“convergence and divergence in the G20 ”does not “follow the traditional alliances”
(p 3). While the BRICS met as a group on the sidelines at the 2012 Los Cabos Summit,
Schirm argues that what we have seen develop are a number of issue-specific ad hoc
groups with the “former international groups—the G7, the developing countries’ G20,
and the BRICS” being superseded by these ad hoc groupings (p 20). Among these ad
hoc alignments are the MIST countries (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey)
that, while a very heterogeneous group, all combine rapid economic growth with the
desire of playing a larger international role as middle powers.
Conclusion
A central element of the globalization policy introduced in 1994 by the Kim Young-
sam government was to break away from the constrains of the South–North conflict
and the traditional reliance on the USA, and join the club of advanced nations.
Measured solely by objective capabilities Korea was without doubt by the early
1990s a middle power, but it lacked the aspirations, and in particular the political
leadership, necessary to play a larger international role. The Kim Young-sam gov-
ernment, with its globalization policy, remedied that as it established enhancing the
global influence and status of Korea as an explicit foreign policy goal, and sought to
engage in the type of behavior usually associated with middle power status.
The succeeding Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun Administrations remained
committed to the policy goal of a more active Korean role regionally and globally,
and also continued, or even broadened, the country’s middle power type activism, as
they acknowledged that middle power status comes with the expectation of a certain
type of behavior.
As previous presidents since the introduction of the segyehwa policy, President
Lee Myung-bak, also saw enhancing the global role of Korea as central to his
administration’s foreign policy objectives, and he continued the trend of broadening
the country’s middle power behavior. Korea here benefited from the shift from G8 to
G20 that facilitated its inclusion among the countries that could be seen as members
of the global economic steering committee. The Lee Myung-bak government viewed
Korea being chosen as the first non-G8 country to host a G20 Summit as evidence of
the successful conclusion of a journey towards ‘advanced nationhood’ begun in 1994
as part of the segyehwa policy, with the country, in the words of President Lee, having
“hit the road towards a bigger global role as an advanced nation” (President Lee
quoted by Yonhap News Agency, January 11, 2011).
That Korea is willing, and able to, play a larger international role as a middle power
was also in evidence as the country was hosting the 4th High-level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Following upon the Accra meeting in 2008 more than
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3000 delegates met to review progress on implementing the principles of the Paris
Declaration of 2005. Korean leadership was here instrumental in the attempt at building
a bridge between donors (mostlyWestern democracies) and developing countries. It was
in no small measure due to this leadership that we saw the signing of the Busan
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation that for the first time established a
framework for development cooperation which might down the road lead to significant
changes in the relationship between donor countries and aid recipient countries.
The new government under President Park Geun-hye, inaugurated in early 2013,
will mostly likely continue seeking to expand Korea’s role in global affairs through
the type of activities we associate with middle powers, and which this article has
shown were increasingly pursued by her predecessors. However, in this she will face
a number of obstacles, one of them being the continued hostility between North and
South on the peninsula. While arguing that Korea’s ability to engage in middle power
activism depends “on solid cooperation with the United States” (Choi 2009, 56)
might be overstating the case, having hosted the G20 Summit and then just a couple
weeks after the summit be faced with a North Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong
Island reminded everybody of the potential for conflict on the peninsula. This it must
have brought home yet again to the government the realization that, while Korea
might have joined the exclusive club of ‘advanced nations’ and by both objective
capabilities and behavior should be considered a middle power, the firm alignment
with the USA that the continuing hostility on the peninsula creates the need for, while
at the same time seeking to avoid entanglement in the increasing competition between
a US pivoting towards Asia and a rising China, might at times constrain the country’s
agential ability to act as a middle power.
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